Регионы в современном мире: глобализация и Азия. Зарубежное регионоведение

Коллектив авторов, 2020

В монографии проводится комплексный и нюансированный анализ характера, темпов и проявлений глобализации в Азии и ее регионах сквозь призму политической, экономической, информационно-цифровой и социокультурной динамики. Дается оценка проявлений глобализации в странах Ближнего Востока, Восточной, Юго-Восточной и Южной Азии. Уточняется влияние китайской мега-стратегии «Пояс и путь» на внутрирегиональное и межрегиональное сотрудничество на азиатском и евразийском пространствах. Определены особенности информационно-коммуникативных процессов современной Азии в их увязке с политико-экономическими трансформациями азиатских обществ. Проведено исследование актуальных вопросов развития искусства и литературы государств Азии. Раскрыты механизмы инновационных подходов к преподаванию восточных языков в их увязке с методологическими задачами современного востоковедения. Монография подготовлена на основе докладов, представленных участниками I международной конференции «Процессы глобализации в современной Азии», прошедшей в НИУ ВШЭ 20–21 ноября 2019 года.

1. Китайский проект глобализации

Растущее влияние Китая на Балканах: вызовы и перспективы

ДУШАН ПРОРОКОВИЧ

Руководитель Центра евразийских исследований Института международной политики и экономики, доцент факультета дипломатии и безопасности, Белград, Сербия

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Появление Китая как участника региональной политики на Балканах — совершенно новое явление. Влияние Китая и в экономике, и в политике неуклонно растет, и были предприняты взаимные шаги для укрепления военного сотрудничества. Китайские компании стали важнейшими инвесторами, от которых зависит экономическое развитие в регионе, китайские банки финансируют крупные инфраструктурные проекты в регионе. Заметным стало и присутствие Китая в культурной политике, появились центры научного сотрудничества. Учитывая, что ЕС и НАТО считают Китай геополитическим противником, нет сомнения, что они используют институциональные механизмы и экономическое давление для сдерживания Китая на Балканах. Но в свете итогов сотрудничества между Китаем и балканскими странами у этого формата есть перспективы. Тем не менее в будущем это сотрудничество ждут серьезные испытания.

Ключевые слова: Китай, Балканы, Западные Балканы, китайское влияние, ЕС, НАТО.

CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN THE BALKANS: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

DUŠAN PROROKOVIĆ

Head of the Center for Eurasian Studies at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Associate Professor, Faculty for Diplomacy and Security, Belgrade, Serbia

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The emergence of China as a regional policy actor in the Balkans is a completely new phenomenon. China’s influence has been growing, both in economy and in politics, and initial steps have been taken to improve military relations. To date, Chinese companies have become indispensable investors, on which economic growth in the region depends, and banks are important lenders that finance the construction of some of the most important infrastructure projects. The offensive of Chinese institutions in the field of cultural diplomacy is also visible, with the expansion of scientific cooperation with research centers in the Balkans. Given that the EU and NATO have recognized China as a geopolitical challenger and Chinfluence as a threat, it is undoubted that they will use institutional mechanisms and economic leverage to attempt to limit or squeeze China out of the Balkans. From the perspective of the ten-year development of relations between China and the Balkan countries, this format has a perspective. At the same time, looking at the long-term interests of the EU and NATO, there are many challenges ahead.

Keywords: China, Balkans, Western Balkans, Chinfluence, EU, NATO.

Introduction

The emergence of China as a regional policy actor in the Balkans is a completely new phenomenon. Namely, from 1958 to 1978, China established special ties with Albania. China returned to this region 30 years later. Since 2009, China’s influence has been growing, both in economy and in politics.

The growth of Chinese influence in the Balkans has been recorded since the implementation of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Intensified political contacts and first investments emerged in 2009, at the stage when the BRI was being prepared. Since 2013, we have been witnessing a kind of “eruption” [Dimitrijević, Ping, 2017].

The Balkan Peninsula is an integral part of the European (Maritime) Route. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang “described the port of Piraeus as a pearl in the Mediterranean Sea and said it could become one of the most competitive ports of the world”¹. Also, the Balkans is well connected (transport and economic ties) with Western Turkey (CAWA route) and Central Europe (NELB).

As a result, in September 2019, a direct railway connection was established via NELB from Jinan (Shandong Province) to Belgrade (Serbia)². In this context, the initiative to modernize the Belgrade–Budapest railway should also be considered. In 2014 governments of China, Serbia, Hungary and Macedonia signed an agreement on the modernization of railroad traffic with the intention to extend the Budapest-Belgrade railway to the south towards Macedonia and Greece through a North-South vertical. Thus, the new transport corridor would connect the port in Piraeus and the most important traffic junctions of Central Europe, which are part of the NELB.

Тhe CEE (Central — Eastern Europe) region “is attractive to China thanks to its strategic geographical position for the New Silk Road project, its high-skilled yet cheap labour, and its open trade and investment environment.” [Stanzel, 2016. P. 1].

Тable 1: Land and Maritime routes — Belt and Road Initiative³

Table 2: Chinese firms’ major construction contracts in the Western Balkans, 2010–2017 [Holzner, Schwarzhappel, 2018. P. 17]

The number of major Chinese projects contracted in the Western Balkans (shown in Table 2) “since the outbreak of the global financial crisis is non-negligible. Overall, Chinese infrastructure projects make up about USD 9.1 billion (EUR 7.8 billion). Almost 90% of these, however, have been initiated only since 2013. The most important transport sector contractor is the predominantly state-owned China Communications Construction Company. In the energy sector, the state-owned China National Machinery Industry Corporation — known as Sinomach — is the leading contractor. Geographically, the prime target of Chinese construction contracts is Serbia.” [Holzner, Schwarzhappel, 2018. P. 17]. The increased interest of Chinese investors and banks in investing in Greece is also evident (shown in Table 3).

In Bulgaria „In the realm of infrastructure, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) signed in 2019 a €120 million contract with the joint stock company Logistical Center-Varna for the joint development of port infrastructure in Bulgaria’s largest seaside city of Varna. This is the first project of its kind that Beijing is going to realize in Bulgaria and is part of the Belt and Road Initiative. China has also made a major investment in innovative Bulgarian business. The China-CESEE Investment Corporation Fund (a $500 million private equity fund launched in 2014 through financing provided by the Exim Bank of China) acquired a 10% share in Walltopia — a world leading Bulgarian manufacturer and installer of mounting walls. Moreover, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has expressed interest in the construction of the Belene nuclear power plant in cooperation with Russia’s Rosatom.”⁴ Chinese companies are also increasingly present in Romania: „The Dutch multinational company Nidera, the largest trader in commodities for agricultural markets with operations in Romania, which was taken over in 2017 by COFCO, China; The American company Smithfield Foods, a global leader in pig farms and pork production, with a branch in Romania that manages 46 farms in the counties of Timi and Arad, which was taken over in 2013 by Shuanghui International, in the largest ever Chinese acquisition of an American company (over USD 7 billion); The famous Italian tyre maker, the world’s fifth largest, Pirelli, which was taken over in 2015 by the Chinese state conglomerate ChemChina in a USD 7.7 billion deal, including two factories in Romania”. [Pencea, 2017. P. 24]. Curiosity is the fact that China’s most modest activities have been detected in Albania. „In 2016 China’s Everbright Group bought Tirana’s Nënë Tereza International Airport Company and it has a concession on the airport until 2027. The aim is to set up a logistics centre to transport Chinese goods into Europe and to promote tourism in Albania, especially tourists from China“⁵.

Of course, some authors are right to state that „these projects are not FDI, but mostly public investment contracts financed by Chinese banks; not all the projects might be realised.“ [Holzner, Schwarzhappel, 2018. P. 17]. So the data presented in Tables 2. and 3. can also be deceiving.

Several major projects announced in Bulgaria and Romania have failed or have been delayed.⁶

Table 3: Major Chinese Investments in Greece 2009–2017. [Bastian, 2017. Р. 10]

In Romania “The Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant is one of the most important Romanian — Chinese projects that have not been implemented. Because of the quick succession of Romanian governments, the negotiations were delayed for more than two years. /…/ The project was estimated to cost around 6.4 billion euro (8 billion dollars).” [Popescu, Brînză, 2018. P. 32]. A preliminary investors’ agreement has been signed in May 2019, but now, after five years of negotiations, a new problem has arisen: “The fact that the Chinese partner is under US sanctions would make this subject very politically sensitive for Nuclearelectrica“⁷.

In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the reasons for the relative failure should also be sought in the EU’s membership of the two countries. „As an EU Member State Bulgaria has an access to the EU Structural Funds which provide partial grants and this makes Chinese loans less attractive.“ [Zhelev, 2018. P. 12]

However, despite some failures, it should be emphasized that China’s presence in the Balkan economies has been expanding since 2009, and especially since the launch of the BRI in 2013. Everything the Chinese have accomplished has been done in just 5–10 years.

1. Western Powers vs Chinfluence

The rapid spread of Chinese influence in the Balkans has caused both EU and US reactions. European Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Hahn warned of the role of China in the Western Balkans and the possibility that Beijing will transform the region’s countries into Trojan horses that will one day be members of the EU⁸.

„The German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel appealed to EU members to pursue a common foreign policy vis-à-vis China to counter Beijing’s tactics: If we do not succeed, for example, in developing a single strategy towards China, then China will succeed and dividing Europe, he said. China is increasingly anticipated by the EU as a threat.“ [Prorokovic, 2017. P. 9]. For US analysts, the Chinese approach is clear, and therefore very problematic: „Interestingly, a comparison could be made with the United States between the two world wars and China’s promotion of the MSRI (Maritime Silk Road Initiative, as a part of BRI, remark by D. P.).“ [Blanchard, Flint, 2017. P. 235].

To a certain extent, it is unbelievable that Chinese influence is growing despite the fact that most Balkan countries are in the EU and/or NATO. The analysis of Slovenian IFIMES offers a simple explanation of this phenomenon: “European leaders have often confirmed their support to the Western Balkans and its Euro Atlantic road, expressing at the same time concerns about the impact of individual states in the region, particularly Russia, China and Turkey. The EU with its enlargement stalemate practically pushes the Western Balkans counters to Russian hug, to blame in the end those countries for their close relations and cooperation with Russia. However, some EU states always set new requirements and membership criteria for the Western Balkans. Some experts have been pointing out that 15 EU member countries would not be able to fully meet the membership criteria now, which are required from the Western Balkans countries.”⁹

In addition, the hypocrisy or double standards of both — the EU institutions and key European countries are often visible. Germany, for example, strongly insisted on the implementation of the Third Energy Package, which essentially meant stopping the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline across the territories of Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary¹⁰. But at the same time, it continued to build the North Stream and the EU did not even try to prevent it. [Proroković, 2018. P. 702].

Similar is the case with NATO, which is a key instrument in securing the US position in the Balkans. The US aggressive policy is based on the securitization of the Russian issue as well as the new attitude of the Donald Trump administration towards acute crises in the Middle East. In this context, the Balkan NATO members are forced to following the US, establishing a restrictive policy towards Russia and supporting Washington’s initiatives in the Middle East, which is not usually in their national interest. [Proroković, 2018a. P. 86–87].

2. Conclusion: Perspectives and Challenges

In contrast to the Western powers, which show a deficit of “optimistic initiatives” or constantly make political demands, the Chinese approach is different. China presents itself as an ambitious and constructive partner. And more importantly for “Balkan Stabilitocracies”, it does not require any political concessions¹¹. This is probably the reason for China’s great success. China is firmly committed to realizing the geo-economic goals of the BRI and is taking a number of initiatives in the Balkans. To some extent, it is even noticeable that „the number and intensity of China’s economic and political initiatives in the Balkans since 2013 are utterly disproportionate to the size of the markets and the foreign trade importance of these countries to China.” [Proroković, 2016. P. 54–55]. Therefore, it can be concluded that China is projecting the pace and scope of its presence in the region. China has become a serious challenger to the US and EU in the Balkans. Therefore, China is an actor who will become more involved in regional political and security issues in the future.

However, the West’s advantage in the Balkans is characterized by its deep institutional presence (EU and/or NATO membership) and widespread economic ties (which are completely disproportionate, so that the export of the Balkan countries is predominantly EU oriented). Given that the EU and NATO have recognized China as a geopolitical challenger and Chinfluence as a threat, it is undoubted that they will use institutional mechanisms and economic leverage to attempt to limit or squeeze China out of the Balkans.

From the perspective of the ten-year development of relations between China and the Balkan countries, this format has a perspective. At the same time, looking at the long-term interests of the EU and NATO, there are many challenges ahead.

References

Bastian J. The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-Eastern Europe along the ʼBalkan Silk Roadʼ. Athens // London: Report prepared by Dr Jens Bastian for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (with funding from the Central European Initiative), July 2017. P. 62. (in English)

Blanchard Jean-Marc F. and Colin F. The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk RoadInitiative // Geopolitics, 2017. 22 (2), 2017. Р. 223–245. (in English)

Dimitrijevíc D. and Huang Ping (Eds.). Initiatives of the ‘New Silk Road’ — Achievements and Challenges. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2017. P. 529. (in English)

Ghiasy R. and Fei Su, Saalman L. The 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road: Security implications and ways forward for the European Union. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2018. P. 63. (in English)

Holzner M. and Schwarzhappel M. Infrastructure Investment in the Western Balkans, Luxembourg: European Investment Bank — Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, 2018. P. 38. (in English)

Pencea S. Romania-China Trade and Investment Relations Against the Backdrop of ʼOne Belt, One Roadʼ Strategy // Romanian Economic and Business Review, 2017. Vol. 12, number 2. Р. 17–28. (in English)

Popescu L. and Brînză A. Romania-China Relations. Political and Economic Challenges in the BRI Era // Romanian Journal of European Affairs, 2018. 18 (2). Р. 20–39. (in English)

Prorokovic D. China — CEE relations need new strategies // China Daily, November 27. 2017. Р. 9. (in English)

Prorokovíc D. Geoekonomski aspekti kineske koncepcije OBOR i pozicija Srbije, Crne Gore i BiH // Nacionalni interes, 2016. XII (26), 2/2016. Р. 35–58. (in Serbian)

Prorokovíc D. Od Soluna do Sofije: zašto je slabio uticaj EU na Zapadnom Balkanu? In: Dragan Simić, Dejan Milenković, Dragan Živojinović (Eds.). Evropa za mene. Beograd: Fakultet političkih nauka — Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2018. Р. 693–702. (in Serbian)

Prorokovíc D. Pogled na Srbiju iz okvira evroatlantizma kao geopolitičkog koncepta: zašto srpski interesi nisu podudarni sa američkim ciljevima? // Politika nacionalne bezbednosti, 2018a. IX (14), 1/2018. P. 73–88. (in Serbian)

Ramasamy B. and Yeung M., Utoktham C., Duval Y. Trade and trade facilitation along the Belt and Road Initiative corridors // Working Paper Series, No. 172, Asia — Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade — UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 2017. Р. 9–22. (in English)

Stanzel A. Chinaʼs Investment in Influence: the future of 16 + 1 cooperation // China Analysis, Brussels: European Council on Foreign relations. 2016. P. 16. (in English)

Zhelev P. Bulgarian — Chinese economic relations in the context of 16+1 Cooperation // China — CEE Institute, 2018. Working paper No. 28. Р. 12–14. (in English)

Китайско-германские отношения в рамках инициативы «Один пояс, один путь»

ГАЛИМЗЯНОВА АЛЬБИНА КАРИМОВНА

преподаватель кафедры восточных языков Дипломатическая академия МИД России

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Данная статья посвящена анализу перспектив китайско-германского сотрудничества в рамках инициативы «Один пояс, один путь». Автор подчеркивает, что данная инициатива поможет укрепить глобальный характер двусторонних отношений, а также укрепить сотрудничество в финансовом секторе. Реализация инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» позволит Китаю и Германии сотрудничать в целях содействия стабильности и процветанию стран, расположенных вдоль Шелкового пути, таких как страны Центральной Азии. Инициатива способна объединить культуры и народы стран, расположенных вдоль Шелкового пути. Кроме того, к Шелковому пути примыкают нестабильные регионы, такие как Ближний Восток и Африка. Принимая во внимание, что Европа, и в частности Германия, страдает от притока мигрантов, Китай и Германия заинтересованы в достижении стабильности в регионе. В настоящее время существуют прямые грузовые рейсы между городами Германии и Китая, такими как Чунцин–Дуйсбург, Чжэнчжоу–Гамбург, Шэньян–Лейпциг, Пекин–Нюрнберг. Подчеркнуто, что Германия также поддерживает и принимает активное участие в строительстве Азиатского банка инфраструктурных инвестиций.

Ключевые слова: Китай, Германия, международные отношения, мировая политика, «Один пояс, один путь».

SINO-GERMAN COOPERATION UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF THE «ONE BELT, ONE ROAD» INITIATIVE

GALIMZYANOVA ALBINA KARIMOVNA

Lecturer, Department of Oriental Languages, Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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Sino-German cooperation under the framework of the «One Belt, One Road» initiative can strengthen the global nature of bilateral relations, set in motion the process of bilateral trade and investments, cooperation in third country markets, as well as strengthen cooperation in the financial sector. This will benefit not only Chinese companies, European goods, services and the financial sector will also be able to develop new markets.

The implementation of the «One Belt, One Road» initiative will allow China and Germany to cooperate in order to promote the stability and prosperity of countries alongside the Silk Road Route, such as the countries of Central Asia. The initiative is able to unite the cultures and peoples of the Silk Road countries.

In addition, unstable regions such as the Middle East and Africa also adjoin the Silk Road. Taking into account that Europe, and Germany in particular, is suffering from an influxes of migrants and refugees from Syria, China and Germany are interested in achieving stability and development in the region.

Currently, there are direct freight trains between the following German and Chinese cities, such as Chongqing–Duisburg, Zhengzhou–Hamburg, Shenyang — Leipzig, Beijing–Nuremberg. The China–Europe Express runs from Shilong railway station, Guangdong province to Duisburg. Germany also supports and takes an active part in the construction of the «Asian infrastructure investment Bank».

Keywords: China, Germany, international relations, foreign policy, “One Belt, One Road” initiative.

Инициатива «Один пояс, один путь», выдвинутая председателем КНР Си Цзиньпином в сентябре 2013 года во время государственного визита в Казахстан, направлена на развитие новых транспортных путей и торгово-экономических коридоров. Основу китайской инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» составляют «пять коммуникаций»: взаимосвязанная инфраструктура, беспрепятственная торговля, финансирование капитала, политическая коммуникация и связь между народами, которые основаны на принципе взаимного сотрудничества, совместного строительства и общедоступности и характеризуются открытостью и терпимостью [Кэлинь Фулиньтэ, Чжан Сяотун, 2016年，第1–24页]. Проект призван объединить страны Европы и Центральной Азии, а также страны Африки во имя мира, открытости, сотрудничества и всеобщего выигрыша.

Китайско-германские отношения переживают лучший период развития в истории. Страны установили отношения всеобъемлющего стратегического партнерства, и двустороннее сотрудничество все крепнет. Германия также играет ведущую роль и в отношениях Китая с Европейским союзом [Чжэн Чуньжун, 2015. С. 1–14].

После того как Китай выдвинул инициативу «Один пояс, один путь», европейские ученые начали изучать ее возможное влияние на Европу [Casarini, 2016. P. 1–14]. Большое внимание данной инициативе было уделено и со стороны правительства Германии. Это связано не только с вышеупомянутым высоким положением Германии в ЕС и с высоким уровнем китайско-германских отношений, но и обусловлено историческими и географическими причинами. Впервые представление и понятие о Великом Шелковом пути было предложено немецким геологом, географом и путешественником бароном Фердинандом фон Рихтгофеном (1833–1905). Согласно его концепции, Китай и Германия расположены на двух концах экономического пояса Великого Шелкового пути и являются двумя основными экономическими системами и полюсами роста Европы и Азии. Ожидается, что вместе эти две страны разовьются в два крупнейших межотраслевых рынка Евразии. В поисках ответа на вопрос о потенциале инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» для развития китайско-германских отношений обратимся к более детальному рассмотрению скрытого потенциала инициативы.

Среди стран Европы одним из активных сторонников инициативы является Германия. Правительство ФРГ активно поддерживает и принимает участие в инициативе «Один пояс, один путь» главным образом потому, что немецкая сторона видит колоссальный потенциал инициативы, направленный на развитие китайско-германских отношений. Китайско-германское сотрудничество в рамках инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» способно усилить глобальный характер двусторонних отношений, привести в движение двусторонние торгово-экономические инвестиции, а также укрепить сотрудничество в финансовом секторе.

Германия самая первая из европейских стран выразила свое одобрение инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» и положительно восприняла намерение стран-учредительниц вступить в Азиатский банк инфраструктурных инвестиций.

10 октября 2014 года Китай и Германия провели третий раунд межправительственных консультаций в Берлине и совместно опубликовали документ: «Платформа китайско-немецкого сотрудничества: совместное формирование инноваций». Статья 8 этого документа гласит: «Немецкая сторона приветствует расширение сухопутного торгового пути между Китаем и Европой и инициативу экономического пояса Шелкового пути. Это откроет новые возможности для китайско-германского и китайско-европейского сотрудничества и будет способствовать стабильности и процветанию региона Центральной Азии и примыкающих государств»¹². 29 октября 2015 года, когда федеральный канцлер Германии Ангела Меркель в восьмой раз посетила Китай с официальным визитом, Си Цзиньпин заявил, что Китай ценит активную поддержку и участие немецкой стороны в инициативе «Один пояс, один путь» и в проекте Азиатский банк инфраструктурных инвестиций. Меркель, в свою очередь, заявила, что в новой обстановке немецкая сторона готова углублять практическое сотрудничество с Китаем в области экономики, торговли, промышленности и финансов, а также активно участвовать в инициативе «Один пояс, один путь» и в строительстве Азиатского банка инфраструктурных инвестиций¹³. На пресс-конференции в ходе визита Меркель еще раз подчеркнула, что Германия уделяет пристальное внимание инвестиционным проектам в рамках «Шелкового пути», и выразила готовность внести в них свой вклад.

Во избежание внутренней конкуренции между странами ЕС по сотрудничеству с Китаем в рамках инициативы «Один пояс, один путь», а также для того, чтобы сотрудничество между Китаем и Европой соответствовало стандартам ЕС в области государственных закупок, интеллектуальной собственности, правилам честной конкуренции, Германия с самого начала подчеркивает роль ЕС в инициативе «Один пояс, один путь» и способствует созданию соответствующего контактного механизма между Китаем и Европой. С этой целью после подписания меморандума о взаимопонимании в сентябре 2015 года, устанавливающего платформу взаимосвязи между Китаем и Европой¹⁴, Германия всегда подчеркивала центральную роль этой платформы во взаимосвязи Китая и Европы [Цуй Хунвэй, 2016. С. 51–61]. Это также отражено в коммюнике по итогам четвертого раунда китайско-германских межправительственных консультаций, в котором, в частности, было написано: «Китай и Германия будут изучать вопрос о содействии участию немецких компаний в существующих механизмах (особенно в платформе взаимосвязи Китай–Европа), расширять сотрудничество в сфере промышленных инвестиций и финансов»¹⁵.

Германия также поддерживает и принимает активное участие в строительстве Азиатского банка инфраструктурных инвестиций. 17 марта 2015 года в совместном заявлении Китая и Германии по итогам Первого финансового диалога на высоком уровне, Германия объявила о своей готовности присоединиться к Азиатскому банку инфраструктурных инвестиций в качестве потенциального члена-учредителя. Несколькими днями ранее, 13 марта, Великобритания также выразила готовность присоединиться к Азиатскому банку инфраструктурных инвестиций в качестве страны-основателя. Германия с удовлетворением отмечает, что Франция, Италия и Германия изъявили желание присоединиться к Азиатскому банку инфраструктурных инвестиций и сделали совместное заявление о том, что новый банк внесет позитивный вклад в социально-экономическое развитие региона и глобальный экономический рост. Германия занимает весомое место в Азиатском банке инфраструктурных инвестиций: доля Германии составляет 4,5 млрд. долл., она занимает четвертое место после Китая, Индии и России, а также является крупнейшим инвестором за пределами Азии¹⁶.

Правительство Германии увидело огромные возможности для развития взаимовыгодного сотрудничества, которые могут дать инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» и Азиатский банк инфраструктурных инвестиций, и поэтому демонстрирует позицию активной поддержки этих проектов. В то же время Германия подчеркивает большое значение роли ЕС и выступает за то, чтобы сотрудничество Германии и Китая и ЕС и Китая соответствовало нормам и стандартам Европейского союза. Сотрудничество между Германией и Китаем в рамках инициативы «Один пояс, один путь», несомненно, принесет новый потенциал и импульс в будущее развитие китайско-германских отношений.

Реализация инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» поможет придать больше стратегического содержания китайско-германскому сотрудничеству и повысить глобальный характер двусторонних отношений. В последние годы продолжали непрерывно развиваться китайско-германские отношения на высоком уровне, поэтому дальнейшее укрепление двусторонних отношений требует мощного рычага влияния. 28 марта 2014 года президент Си Цзиньпин опубликовал авторскую статью в немецкой газете «Франкфуртер альгемайне», в которой говорилось: «Давайте выйдем за рамки исключительно торговых отношений, чтобы с помощью более открытого и инновационного мышления наделить китайско-германское сотрудничество стратегическим содержанием»¹⁷. Фактически стратегический и глобальный смысл китайско-германских двусторонних отношений постоянно возрастает. На основе создания китайско-германского механизма правительственных консультаций и всеобъемлющего стратегического партнерства Китай и Германия в последние годы также создали диалоговый механизм в области дипломатии и стратегии безопасности, а также финансовый диалоговый механизм на высоком уровне. Кроме того, как было указано в коммюнике по итогам четвертого раунда китайско-германских межправительственных консультаций, укрепилась китайско-германская координация по поиску путей решения глобальных кризисов и конфликтов (таких как Сирия и Афганистан). Усилилось сотрудничество и связи в области глобального управления, особенно после того как Китай и Германия приняли у себя саммит G20 в 2016 и 2017 годах. Все это придало дополнительный импульс сотрудничеству между двумя странами¹⁸. Вдобавок, реализация инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» позволит Китаю и Германии располагать общими интересами и сотрудничать в целях содействия стабильности и процветания стран и регионов, расположенных вдоль «Шелкового пути», таких как, например, Центральная Азия. Кроме того, к «Шелковому пути» также примыкают нестабильные регионы, такие как Ближний Восток и Африка. Принимая во внимание, что Европа, и в частности Германия, страдает от наплыва беженцев из Сирии, Китай и Германия имеют общие интересы в достижении стабильности и развития в регионе.

Более того, инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» также будет способствовать развитию связей между Китаем и Германией в рамках соответствующих многосторонних механизмов. Например, Германия воспользовалась возможностью, выступая в качестве председателя Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (ОБСЕ) в 2016 году, придать этой платформе новую энергию, сделав акцент на ведении диалога и обновлении доверия. С этой целью 18–19 мая в Берлине состоялось экономическое совещание ОБСЕ. Китайская сторона также приняла участие.

Инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» поможет продвинуть китайско-германские двусторонние торгово-экономические инвестиции. Это принесет пользу не только китайским компаниям, европейские товары, услуги и финансовый сектор также смогут освоить новые рынки. Например, контейнерный грузовой рейс-экспресс «Китай–Европа» стал локомотивом «Шелкового пути» для продвижения китайско-германских двусторонних экономических и торговых инвестиций главным образом потому, что железнодорожные перевозки имеют очевидные преимущества по сравнению с морскими перевозками, экономя половину времени, а транспортные расходы ниже по сравнению с воздушными перевозками. В марте 2014 года председатель КНР Си Цзиньпин и занимавший в то время пост вице-канцлера Германии Зигмар Габриэль приняли участие в церемонии открытия прямого железнодорожного сообщения Чунцин–Дуйсбург («Чунцин–Синьцзян–Европа»). Это, по-видимому, было первым шагом по китайско-германскому сотрудничеству в рамках инициативы «Один пояс, один путь». В настоящее время между Китаем и Германией проложен целый ряд международных железнодорожных перевозок грузов, таких как Чунцин–Дуйсбург, Чжэнчжоу — Гамбург, Шэньян–Лейпциг, Пекин–Нюрнберг. 14 апреля 2016 года отправился рейс-экспресс «Китай–Европа» с железнодорожной станции Шилун, провинции Гуандун в Дуйсбург. От других рейсов он отличается тем, что отправляется еженедельно по четвергам и обеспечивает нормальную работу¹⁹. China Railways (Китайская железнодорожная корпорация) и Deutsche Bahn AG (немецкий железнодорожный оператор) также подписали соглашение о стратегическом сотрудничестве в области эксплуатации рейса Китай–Европа и высокоскоростных железнодорожных перевозок. В 2015 году между Китаем и Германией было перевезено порядка 30 000 контейнеров. Ожидается, что к 2020 году это число увеличится в три раза и составит около 100 000 контейнеров в год²⁰.

С упрощением перевозок в Центральной Европе связано сотрудничество в области упрощения таможенного оформления и сотрудничество в области высокоскоростных железнодорожных перевозок. В документе «Платформа китайско-немецкого сотрудничества: совместное формирование инноваций», китайская и германская стороны заявили, что «страны взяли на себя инициативу и обязательство создать эффективную цепочку поставок в области железнодорожного транспорта для обеспечения беспрепятственной перевозки грузов». В коммюнике по итогам четвертого раунда китайско-германских межправительственных консультаций стало ясно, что китайская компания-производитель вагонного оборудования CRRC Corporation Limited и немецкая компания по производству электротоваров Siemens сотрудничают в области высокоскоростных железных дорог и совместно осваивают сторонние рынки. Фактически в дополнение к базовым объектам инфраструктуры (включая информационно-коммуникационную инфраструктуру) на сторонних рынках могут быть реализованы и проекты, включающие энергетику, транспорт, защиту окружающей среды, сельское хозяйство и здравоохранение. В рамках сотрудничества Китай и Германия могут дополнять друг друга в области капиталовложения, технологий, рынка и управленческого опыта. А также могут совместно решать вопросы управления безопасностью и стремиться к более широкой международной поддержке и сотрудничеству.

В итоге реализация инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» помогает укреплять сотрудничество между Китаем и Германией в финансовом секторе и будет способствовать превращению юаня в международную валюту. Китай поддерживает строительство и развитие офшорного рынка китайских юаней и местного банка клиринговых услуг для юаня во Франкфурте-на-Майне, а также поддерживает немецкие финансовые учреждения в использовании квоты квалифицированных иностранных институциональных инвесторов (КИИИ) для выхода на китайский рынок. Германия поддерживает юань в присоединении к специальным валютным корзинам Международного валютного фонда, а также поддерживает методы реформирования квот МВФ. В настоящее время благодаря совместным усилиям с немецкой стороной с 1 октября 2016 года Международный валютный фонд уже включил юани в корзину СДР (специальные права заимствования). Кроме того, как уже упоминалось выше, Германия является важным инвестором в Азиатском банке инфраструктурных инвестиций. В то же время при поддержке Германии Китай стал полноправным членом Европейского банка реконструкции и развития. У Китая и Германии широкие перспективы сотрудничества в области инвестиций и финансирования.

Список литературы

Nicola Casarini. When all roads lead to Beijing: Assessing China’s New Silk Road and its implications for Europe // The International Spectator. Italian Journal of International Affairs. 2016, 51 (4). P. 1–14.

Цуй Хунвэй. «Идай Илу» чанъи юй Жункэ тоуцзыцзихуа дуйцзе цяньцзин фэньси [崔宏伟:《“一带一路”倡议与容克投资计划对接前景分析》， 载 《德国研究》，2016年第1期，第51–61页。] Анализ перспектив интеграции инициативы «Один пояс, один путь» и инвестиционного плана Юнкера. Немецкие исследования, No 1, 2016. С. 51–61.

Чжэн Чуньжун. «Дэгоцзайчжцноугуаньсичжундэцзюэсэ»[郑春荣:《德国 在中欧关系中的角色》，载《欧洲研究》， 2015年第3期，第1–14 页。]Роль Германии в китайско-европейских отношениях. Европейские исследования, Выпуск 3, 2015. С. 1–14.

Кэлинь Фулиньтэ, Чжан Сяотун. «Идай Илу» юй диюань чжэнчжи ли-лунь чуансинь [科林•弗林特、张晓通:《“一带一路”与地缘政治理论 创 新》，载《外交评论》，2016年第3期，第1–24页。] Инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» и инновационные геополитические теории. Дипломатический обзор. Выпуск 3, 2016. С. 1–24.

References

Nicola Casarini. When all roads lead to Beijing: Assessing China’s New Silk Road and its implications for Europe // The International Spectator. Italian Journal of International Affairs. 2016, 51 (4). P. 1–14. (in English)

Cui Hongwei. ““Yidai yilu” zhanlüe yu rong ke touzi jihua duijie qianjing fenxi” [崔宏伟：《 “一带一路” 倡议与容克投资计划对接前景分析》，载 《 德国研究》，2016年第1期，第 51–61 页。] Analysis of the prospects for the integration of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative and Juncker’s investment plan. German Studies, 2016, No. 1. P. 51–61. (In Chin.)

Zheng Chunrong. “Deguo zai zhong’ou guanxi zhong de juese”[郑春荣： 《德国在中欧关系中的角色》，载《欧洲研究， 2015年第3期，第1-14页。] The role of Germany in Sino-European relations. European Studies, 2015, No. 3, P. 1–14. (In Chin.)

Kelin Fulinte, Zhang Xiaotong. ““Yidai yilu” yu diyuan zhengzhi lilun chuangxin” [科林•弗林特、张晓通：《 “一带一路” 与地缘政治理论创新， 载《外交评论，2016年第3期，第1-24页。] The “One Belt, One Road” initiative and innovative geopolitical theories. Diplomatic Review, 2016, No. 3. P. 1–24. (In Chin.)

Китайская инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» и ее влияние на Ближний Восток

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Научный cотрудник, Центр изучения России и Центральной Азии, Школа международных исследований, Университет имени Джавахарлала Неру Нью-Дели, Индия

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В последние годы Китай значительно расширил свое экономическое присутствие на Ближнем Востоке. Китайская инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» (OBOR) направлена на экономическое объединение более 60 стран Ближнего Востока, Африки, Европы, Южной Америки и южных регионов Азии. Китайская инициатива OBOR или BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) намерена возродить древний Шелковый путь наряду с морским Шелковым путем. Ближний Восток играет жизненно важную роль в реализации ОПК, поскольку он является источником энергии, обеспечивая более половины импорта сырой нефти Китаем. Кроме того, это также ключевой пункт для доступа на рынки Европы и Африки, где ЕС является крупнейшим экспортным рынком Китая. Китай инвестировал значительные средства в такие секторы, как развитие портов, нефтепереработка, а также развитие инфраструктуры в ближневосточном регионе. Китай также ускорил переговоры о создании зоны свободной торговли между Китаем и Советом сотрудничества стран Персидского залива (ССАГПЗ). Эта статья представляет собой попытку исследовать природу растущего присутствия Китая на Ближнем Востоке и его последствия в регионе. Для Китая Ближний Восток является торговым центром, поскольку около 70% торгового импорта в Китай поступает с Ближнего Востока. Китай также поощряет программы культурного обмена и межличностное взаимодействие. Таким образом, в настоящем исследовании предпринимается попытка проанализировать присутствие Китая на Ближнем Востоке и его усилия по региональной интеграции, поскольку инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» активизировала развитие в таких регионах, как Ближний Восток и Африка, и пытается связать мир в одну нить.

Ключевые слова: Китай, Ближний Восток, «Один пояс, один путь», инфраструктурное развитие, региональная интеграция.

CHINA’S ONE BELT ONE ROAD INITIATIVE AND ITS IMPACT ON MIDDLE EAST

NOMITA TOPPO

Research Scholar, Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School for International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

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In recent years China has significantly expanded its economic footprint in the Middle East. China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, aims to economically connect more than 60 countries throughout Middle East, Africa, Europe, South America and southern regions of Asia. The OBOR or BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) by China intends to revive the ancient Silk Road along with a Maritime Silk Road. The Middle East plays a vital role in the implementation of OBOR as it is a source of energy, providing more than half of China’s crude oil imports. Besides, it is also a pivotal point for market access in Europe and Africa, where the EU is China’s largest export market. China has invested heavily in the sectors including port development, oil and refinery development, and infrastructure development in the Middle East region. China has also accelerated negotiations for the establishment of a free trade area between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This article is an attempt to explore the nature of China’s growing presence in the Middle East, and its implications in the region. For China, Middle East is a trading hub as around 70 per cent of the trade import in China comes from Middle East. China is also promoting cultural exchange programmes and people-to-people interactions. Thus, this paper attempts to analyse China’s presence in the Middle East and its efforts towards regional integration, as the One Belt One Road initiative has initiated development in the regions like Middle East and Africa and is trying to bind the world in one thread.

Keywords: China, Middle East, One Belt One Road, infrastructure development, regional integration.

Introduction

One Belt One Road initiative comprises of two notions introduced by the President of China Xi Jinping in 2013 to endorse economic engagement and investment along two major routes. The first route, the New Silk Road Economic Belt, is reported to run westward overland through Central Asia to Europe. The second route, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, is expected to make a loop around south and westward by sea towards Europe, with proposed stopovers in South-east Asia, South Asia and Africa.

In recent years, Chinese companies are leaving their home-based market and going to foreign markets and establish itself. President Xi is putting efforts to strengthen China’s global position. He has declared several high-profile multilateral initiatives envisioned to advance China’s international existence and promote closer ties with other countries. One belt, one road “not only represents a renewed, stronger and better coordinated push to expand China’s influence overseas, but it is also coupled with a domestic investment drive, in which nearly every Chinese province has a stake²¹.”

Research methodology

The broad mandate of this research is to examine and analyze the presence of China through the OBOR initiative in the Middle East. Examining the implications of OBOR in the Middle east and its effort in regional integration constitutes one of the prime tasks of this research. The proposed study is based on qualitative analysis. The data is obtained majorly from primary and secondary sources. Primary source include official record, government documents, data reports, official policy statements and also speeches and interviews on popular media. Documents of international and regional organisations like MENA and SCO will be used in this study. These will establish imperial basis of this research. The study will also make use of secondary sources such as books, newspapers, journals, articles published in academic journals and internet sources. These will extensively be used for the analysis of all the available primary and secondary sources will apply throughout the study.

China’s Obor Initiative

OBOR is a vision launched by President Xi that seeks to integrate China with the Eurasian landmass through an immense network of transport corridors, energy pipelines and telecom infrastructures. The geographic span of OBOR is fairly large, covering around 65 countries, 4.4 billion people and 30 per cent of global GDP²². Although the initiative is called One Belt, One Road, which has created an impression that it is just one corridor, rather the two main routes actually have a series of sub-branches and various economic corridors like for instance, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), or the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC). Therefore in 2015 China tried to change the name to Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). However, still it is popularly known as OBOR.

OBOR is China’s long-term development strategy. However, in the short term, it is a means to offset higher domestic production cost and excess capacity, reduce transport cost, create new markets for Chinese goods and services, and internationalize the Chinese currency RMB. Whereas, in the long term, China requires to ensure it has timely, efficient, and secure access to markets and resources as in the present it is the worlds’ largest trading nation. Chinas presence in the Middle East is of great importance as it links the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe.

Main Results

The main finding of the study is summed by under the following subheadings: OBOR and Impact on the Middle East; what do countries get in return?

As President Xi Jinping has increased China’s effort to take a more active role internationally, the Middle East has become one of the major regions for staging the OBOR initiative. In July 2018 in a gathering of 21 Arab nations in Beijing, President Xi assured substantial loans and financial aid to support economic development in the region. During the meet the Chinese government also lucratively elevated their relationship to a “strategic partnership²³.”

Effectively, China has planned to launch a mini Marshall Plan for the Middle East and North African region. The main objective of the China-Arab State Cooperation Forum (formed in 2004) is the economic development of the region. China sees economic development as a key to resolve various security and humanitarian problems in the region.

China and the Middle East have mutual interests and their economic relationship is now expanding beyond oil. Chinese companies are pursuing major infrastructure projects in the Middle East region as part of Belt and Road initiative. The Chinese organizations created to support the Belt and Road Initiative is readily providing financing for much-needed infrastructure. Like for instance in Egypt, the Chinese have declared to invest around $50 billion to help the development of the new administrative capital.

The demand of renewable energy, fintech, artificial intelligence, and electric cars are increasing in the Middle East; sectors where China is playing a leading role. Major portion of China’s financing will go toward supporting projects and sectors where China is a global leader, which is being welcomed by the Middle Eastern countries.

Apart from loans and financial aid for economic development, it was also announced at the Arab Summit for the creation of financial consortium. Wherein Arab and Chinese banks will establish a fund of around $3 billion to support “economic reconstruction” and “industrial revival.” The main objective of this group will be to promote cooperation in the fields of oil and gas, nuclear, and clean energy.

Considerably, President Xi has called upon the Arab countries to commence with negotiations for a free trade agreement between China and the Arab countries. Such negotiation is part of President Xi’s larger strategy of exerting its economic influence to negotiate “free trade” agreements with major regions around the globe.

What do countries get in return?

In lieu of cooperating in OBOR projects countries receive preferential financing including grants, interest-free and concessional loans, and other forms of government funding. They also receive a full development package to strengthen their economy. For instance, UAE, which is China’s second largest trading partner in the region that handles 60 per cent of China’s reexports to Europe and Africa with an estimated value of $70 billion each year. China has signed a $300 million deal to develop a manufacturing operation in the free trade zone of Khalifa Port, on the heels of China’s COSCO shipping winning rights ($738 million) to develop and operate a new container terminal for 35 years. While most shipping companies own/ operate terminals and ports on foreign terrain as shipping-centric operations, China differs in that they open new ports and invest in adjoining free trade/ special economic zone and other development initiatives as well so that host countries get the entire development package²⁴.

China is an old ally of Iran and has vested interests, along with Russia, in Iran’s oil and gas industry. China is financing the upgrading of the Tehran-Mashhad railway along with China’s Exim Bank lending US$1.5 billion for the lines electrification. The track of 2,300 km line will eventually link Urumqi, the capital of China’s western Xinjiang Province, to the Iranian capital Tehran, connecting Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan along the way²⁵.

The proposed railway project is supposed to run from Tehran and join Iran’s east-west network leading west to Turkey and Eastern Europe. It is also expected to open a way to Europe by a developing rail route from the southern Iranian ports to Azerbaijan and Europe. Further linking with the Iran’s North-South Transport Corridor, this runs from Chabahar Port north to Azerbaijan. Towards the east, this links up with the also Chinese funded, low key Lapis Lazuli Corridor.

The rail project will extend from Tehran into Turkey and across the borders with the European Union. Additionally, Turkey is also being linked with rail freight lines running north through China and across Kazakhstan, to Baku in Azerbaijan. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway provides a direct link to Europe from China, via Turkey as it connects through a cross-Turkey. A high-speed rail service is being constructed by China, connecting Kars with Edirne, near Turkey’s border with Bulgaria and Greece. Bilateral trade between Turkey and China was recorded at US$26.3 billion in 2017. Turkey’s export to China was around US$3 billion while its imports from China exceeded US$23 billion.

China has extensively invested in Syria for developmental purpose. According to Ellis, this is «an opportunistic and geopolitical play; opportunistic as Chinese contractors are looking at reconstruction projects to rebuild the country after its devastating civil war, and geo-political as China recognizes that Syria can provide an alternative route to Europe than the Suez Canal»²⁶. This region is being developed by the Chinese with a Special Economic Zone which is being built in Tripoli Port, and plans to rebuild the Tripoli-Homs Railway. The zone provides Chinese and other regional businesses with low tax options for consolidating and adding value to component parts sourced elsewhere to then be exported to Syria. As per the estimate of the United Nations, it will coast around US$250 billion to rebuild the region. As Syria is oil rich region, China can initiate with the infrastructure building and in return secure energy supplies. Meanwhile, develop a secondary route to the Mediterranean and southern Europe.

China is a big investor in Israel and has plenty of opportunity in the market, in the fields including real estate, transportation, energy, telecommunications, and other infrastructure requirements. Its ports and trade routes to the Middle East make it a major gateway to Europe for the Middle East, which is beneficial for China. Projects in Saudi Arabia, and the other Arabian states include gas pipelines, to meet Chinese demand and also a better consistent energy network across the region.

In 2018 President Xi visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran²⁷, and released its first Arab Policy Paper to signal its intention of increased engagement in the Mideast. The paper outlined the “1+2+3” cooperation framework²⁸. China is also trying to balance ties with Riyadh and Tehran, in March Beijing signed $65 billion worth of deals with Riyadh and aims to coordinate OBOR projects with Saudi Vision 2030, while in June China backed Iran’s admission to the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and recently extended a $10 billion credit line for infrastructure projects. Iran is an important node of the OBOR by virtue of its geography linking Central Asia with South and West Asia, while Saudi Arabia is a leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and also a key oil supplier²⁹. With a planned Tripoli Special Economic Zone adjacent to the port, Tripoli could be a useful hub for Syria and enable China via the OBOR to play a constructive role in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

Conclusion

Hence, the study concludes that the ongoing regional security problems including terrorism, economic woes, and a need for immediate infrastructure, investment and trade, the OBOR initiative offers a quick economic aid. As China is becoming a more significant geopolitical actor in the Middle East, gradually the regional countries will become more dependent on Beijing for their trade and investment relations. China’s increasing economic soft power will in turn ease their dependency on the West and broaden their foreign policy options that may not always align with the United States and European Union interests. This would also reduce Western control over the region, additionally it increases regional countries’ freedom of action to diversify and engage with more economic partners. It would be beneficial if great powers including the Unites States, European Union, China, India, Russia and others also try to cooperate to jointly promote Middle East stability, security and prosperity.

References

Aneja A. China reaches out to West Asia, The Hindu, 23 March 2017. (in English)

Awasthi S. China-led BRI and its Impact on India with Specific Reference to CPEC // Journal of International Affairs, 2018, Vol 2 No 1. P. 97–110. (in English)

Ehteshami A. and Horesh N. China’s Presence in the Middle East: The Implications of the One Belt, One Road Initiative, 2019, Routledge. (in English)

Frans-Paul van der Putten et al eds. The Geopolitical Relevance of Piraeus and China’s New Silk Road for Southeast Europe and Turkey, Clingendael Report, 2016. P. 27. (in English)

Johny S. China’s long game in West Asia // The Hindu, 29 January 2016. (in English)

Lin C., The Belt and Road and China’s Long-term Visions in the Middle East, ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, 2017. Vol. 512. P. 1–10. (in English)

Macaes B. Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order. Penguin Viking, 2019. 288 р. (in English)

Olimat M. China and the Middle East from Silk Road to Arab Spring, Routledge, 2015. 240 р. (in English)

Sevilla H. China’s New Silk Route Initiative: Political and Economic Implications for the Middle East and Southeast Asia, 2017, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies Volume 11, Issue 1. P. 83–106. (in English)

Shichor Y. Gains and Losses: Historical Lessons of China’s Middle East Policy for Its OBOR Initiative, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2018, Vol. 12 Issue 2. P. 127–141. (in English)

Значение Китайского проекта «Один пояс — один путь» для российской экономики

ДАВЫДЕНКО ЕЛИЗАВЕТА ВАСИЛЬЕВНА

кандидат экономических наук, доцент кафедры международного предпринимательства Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета аэрокосмического приборостроения

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Китайский масштабный проект «Один пояс, один путь», анонсированный в 2013 году, представляет значительный интерес для России. Учитывая санкции, введенные западными странами, и дальнейшее укрепление торгово-экономических и политических отношений со странами Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона, Россия и Китай укрепляют сотрудничество в рамках данной инициативы. Особенно актуальным и острым в связи с расхождением целей и интересов китайской и российской сторон является вопрос сопряжения проекта «Один пояс, один путь» и Евразийского экономического союза. Как показывает шестилетний опыт реализации инициативы «Один пояс, один путь», реализация проекта идет не гладко и вызывает многочисленные нарекания в адрес Китая из-за навязывания интересов и условий кабалы другим странам, коррупционной составляющей проекта и его непрозрачности. Таким образом, отношение к проекту неоднозначное, и в этих условиях важно выстраивать отношения между Россией и Китаем оптимальным образом для взаимовыгодного сотрудничества. Целью исследования является анализ влияния китайского проекта «Один пояс, один путь» на российскую экономику. Предметом исследования является китайский проект «Один пояс, один путь». Автор приходит к выводу, что в настоящее время российское участие в проекте «Один пояс, один путь» имеет в основном потенциальные преимущества и возможности, а реальные результаты для российской экономики весьма незначительны.

Ключевые слова: Китай, экономика, Евразийский экономический союз, «Один пояс, один путь», Россия.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CHINESE PROJECT “ONE BELT — ONE ROAD” FOR THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

DAVYDENKO ELIZAVETA VASILEVNA

Associate Professor, The department of international entrepreneurship St. Petersburg State university of aerospace instrumentation

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The Chinese large — scale project «One belt — one road» announced in 2013, is of significant interest to Russia. Taking into account the sanctions imposed by Western countries and the further strengthening of trade, economic and political relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, Russia and China are strengthening cooperation within the framework of this initiative. Particularly relevant and acute due to the divergence of goals and interests of the Chinese and Russian sides is a question of interface of the project «One belt — one road» and the Eurasian Economic Union. As the six years’ experience of the «One belt — one road» initiative shows, the implementation of the «One belt — one road» project does not go smoothly and causes numerous criticism of China in imposing interests and conditions of bondage to other countries, the corruption component of the project and its opacity. Thus, the attitude to the project is ambiguous, and in these conditions, it is important to build relations between Russia and China in an optimal way for mutually beneficial cooperation. The aim of the study is to analyze the impact of the Chinese project «One belt — one road» on the Russian economy. The subject of the study is the Chinese project «One belt — one road». The author comes to the conclusion that at present the Russian participation in the project “One belt has mainly potential advantages and possibilities and real results for the Russian economy are very insignificant.

Keywords: China, economy, Eurasian Economic Union, «One belt — one road», Russia.

Introduction

The importance of studying the impact of the Chinese project «One belt — one road» on the Russian economy is beyond doubt. The Chinese project is an open initiative and any country can join it. The project has a huge multiplier effect and is very attractive not only for China, but also for other countries. One of the active participants of the concept of «One belt — one road» is Russia. Nowadays Russia and China are strengthening economic and political cooperation within the framework of this initiative. This article will analyze the impact of the Chinese mega project «One belt — one road» on the Russian economy, highlight its advantages and disadvantages.

Methodology

In the course of the study the author identifying the advantages and disadvantages of the influence of the Chinese project «One belt — one road» on the Russian economy, used a comparative method, analysis and synthesis. The research is based on the materials of Russian and foreign experts and scientists.

Main results

The Chinese project «One belt — one road», combining the «Silk Road Economic belt» and the «Maritime silk road of the XXI century», was first proposed by the President of China — Xi Jinping in 2013. This project is a key element of the general Chinese policy and is aimed at the strengthening China’s position in the international arena, solving China’s domestic economic problems and strengthening regional integration.

This project will lead to significant transformations in the Eurasian space, in particular in the transport and logistics sectors. The project involves the development of cooperation between the countries in five key areas: infrastructure cooperation, political coordination, the growth of mutual trade, strengthening of spiritual unity and free movement of capital³⁰.

According to the project, it is expected that there will be three main routes of the Economic belt: North — from China through Central Asia and Russia to the Europe, Central — from China through the Central and West Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, South — from China to the Southeast and South Asia to the Indian Ocean. Within these areas it is planned to create international corridors: China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia, China-Indochina, China-Pakistan, Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-China.

The Chinese project is an open initiative and any country can join it. In 2019 China has already signed 173 agreements according to the participation in the project with 125 countries and 29 international organizations. It is interesting that over 60 countries joined the project only in 2018. The project has been so deeply integrated into China’s foreign policy that it was mentioned in the Charter of the Communist party of China in 2017³¹.

The scale of the project «One belt — one road» is enormous from the different points of view. For persuasiveness we can give some statistics. Morgan Stanley estimates that by 2027 the project will cost approximately $1.3 trillion. The Chinese banks and financial institutions, mostly state-owned, have invested more than $90 billion in this project. The reason is this project is widely supported by the Chinese government. China’s partners have invested more than $ 40 billion in the Chinese economy. The volume of trade between China and «One belt — one road» participants, which exceeded $6 trillion, is impressive. The trade with project partners increases by an average of 4% per year. Over the six years of the project’s existence it accounted for 27.4% of the Chinese trade in whole³². So, the project has a huge multiplier effect and is very attractive, not only for China, but also for other countries.

One of the active participants of the concept of «One belt — one road» is Russia, supporting it from the very beginning of the project. It is necessary to mention that at present the economic relations between China and Russia are developing very dynamically and positively. The impulse for strengthening cooperation between our countries can be considered the introduction by Western countries sanctions in 2014 against Russia and a turn of Russian foreign economic and political strategy towards the Asia-Pacific region, in particular China.

For optimal cooperation between Russia and China it is important to combine the mutual interests of both countries. The interests of the Russian Federation are related to the deepening of strategic partnership with China, in particular within the framework of the Eurasian economic Union [Efremenko, 2018. P. 48]. China relies on further rapprochement with Russia to ensure stability in the North and a strong strategic rear, investment, trade and economic energy cooperation.

On the 8th May 2015 as part of the institutionalization of cooperation Russia and China signed a Declaration on the interconnection of the Eurasian economic Union and the Silk Road Economic belt. The Declaration identified key directions of contact: investments in industrial cooperation, a development of a common logistics system, a harmonization of foreign trade legislation, a strengthening of the role of joint financial institutions and expansion of foreign exchange cooperation in the field of foreign trade. In 2016 the Memorandum according to the coordination of joint efforts to promote economic and investment cooperation in various international platforms was signed.

In May 2018 another agreement on cooperation in the economic sphere between the Eurasian economic Union and China on trade policy, technical regulation, phytosanitary control was signed. The harmonization of norms and removal of restrictions will certainly give impulse to the development of cooperation. On the 17th October 2018 during the meeting in Beijing it was proposed to accelerate the pairing of projects within the framework of the «One belt initiative”³³ [Efremenko D. 2018]. This idea was also discussed at the fifth Eastern economic forum in 2019³⁴. Thus due to the active political support and stimulation of joint projects there is a significant institutionalization of cooperation between the Eurasian economic Union, the Silk Road Economic belt, the Russian Federation and China [The strategy of «The Economic belt of the silk road» and the role of the Shanghai cooperation organization, 2016. P. 16].

The interaction between the Eurasian economic Union and the «One belt — one road» initiative is primarily considered from the point of view of the development of logistics infrastructure and the creation of transport corridors. The Eurasian economic Union has proposed 38 projects for joint financing with China, including 11 Russian projects³⁵. Thanks to the support of China the construction and development of transport routes connecting Western China and Western Europe and the Northern Sea route are planned.

The implementation of these projects is perfect for China because it will reduce the speed of delivery of goods to the European market (which is especially important because a daily trade volume of China — EU is 1.5 billion euro) and to Russia, as it will help to develop national production and export potential. As to the Russia the transit potential of the TRANS-Siberian railway is not fully used and a participation in the Chinese project will strengthen its role. The most important infrastructure project of fundamental importance for economic partnership between Russia and China is a construction of a railway bridge over the Amur River. The financial operator of this project is the Russian-Chinese investment Fund, formed By the Russian direct investment Fund and China Investment Corporation.

According to the opinion of some experts, the increase in the supply of goods, including transit through the Russian Federation by the help of land transport on the route China-Europe is real, if infrastructure capabilities and increase capacity will be increased. The experts also note two problems. The first one is an imbalance of under loading of trains when they return. The other problem is investment. The participants of the new Silk Road, who take part in the project as transit points, are still afraid to invest in the project, so the main financial burden falls on China. The China’s participation in the Russian projects can be regarded as a «political investment». Despite the loud statements of politicians of the two countries the real results of cooperation between China and Russia in the framework of the project are very modest.

Among project consequences for Russia we can note the following. The participation in the project “One belt — one road” can lead to the integration of the Russian transport system into the transport and logistics network of the Eurasian region, which will open up opportunities for transit and provision of related logistics services and access to the markets of the region³⁶.

Of particular importance within the framework of the project is an interaction of our countries in the field of modernization of poorly developed regions of Siberia and the Far East, which need modern infrastructure and investment. As a concern, we can note a decrease of interest in the TRANS-Siberian and Far Eastern directions. The fact is that the route through Kazakhstan is beneficial for China both in terms of tariff rates and time. At present 10 of the 14 routes China–Russia are passing through Kazakhstan³⁷.

The second advantage is a strengthening of industrial cooperation between the countries, the possibility of forming production clusters. The third plus of the Russian participation in the project “One belt — one road” is a possibility of pairing the Eurasian economic Union and the «One belt — one road» and turning it into a new center of economic and political development at the global level. However, it is worth noting that China is mainly focused on the development of the bilateral relations with each member of the Union individually.

Lately China is accused of opacity and often enslaving terms of agreements, unfair choice of contractors, failure to meet deadlines, untimely provision of promised loans, construction of «white elephants», and damage to the environment. Thus, according to China Global Energy Finance database in 2018 the share of «coal» projects in the project “One belt — one road” was 42%³⁸.

Beijing is also accused of pumping the developing economies involved in the project with loans and debts. The West has even coined a new term — «debt trap diplomacy». In 2019 at the international cooperation forum “One belt — one road” in Beijing the Chinese President promised to become more open to Western investors. China assures the countries that the project has only an economic orientation; however, it is clear for everybody that by increasing economic power the country will gain geopolitical influence³⁹.

The resume

In summary it can be noted that a feature of the Russian and Chinese cooperation in whole and within the framework of the project “One belt — one road” can be called a high level of institutionalization. The economic process is mainly from the top supporting a high political activity of two countries. The Chinese investors act very carefully, and they prefer to conclude agreements rather than invest.

As practice shows a specificity of the Chinese approach is a long-term investigation of the market в длительных переговорных процессах and long negotiation processes that may end up with zero results. So during the reducing of its investments and withdrawing money from the Russian economy in 2018 and 2019 China refused to finance the pipeline “The force of Siberia”, invest in the construction of the Russia’s largest gas processing plant in the Amur region and considered the high-speed railway the Eurasia which was supposed to connect Beijing, Moscow and Berlin unprofitable. Chinese investment companies are often connected with the government financing therefore their investment decisions in many respects are not always motivated only by financial indicators. In our opinion at present the Russian participation in the project “One belt — one road” has mainly potential advantages and possibilities and real results for the Russian economy are very insignificant.

References

China in the world and regional politics. The history and modernity. Issue XXII /ed. Safronov E. Moscow: Institute of Far Eastern studies, 2017. 400 p. URL: https://publications.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/direct/211288436 (date of access: 18.12.2019). (in Russian)

China urged to speed up the pairing of the EAEU with the project «One belt — one road» 17.10.2018. URL: https://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/108722 (date of access: 13.12.2019). (in Russian)

Eastern economic forum 2019. URL: https://roscongress.org/events/vostochnyy-ekonomicheskiy-forum-2019/ (date of access:15.12.2019). (in Russian)

Efremenko D. The conjugation of the Chinese initiative «The Economic belt of the silk road» and the integration project «Eurasian economic Union» in the context of transformations of the modern world // History and modernity. Issue XXIII: annual edition / ed. by Safronov E. Moscow: IDV RAS, 2018. 392 p. (in Russian)

International experts positively assessed the results of the forum «One belt and one road» in Beijing 08.05.2019. URL: https://news.rambler.ru/other/42154117-mezhdunarodnye-eksperty-polozhitelno-otsenili-itogi-foruma-odin-poyas-odin-put-v-pekine/ (date of access: 14.12.2019). (in Russian)

Manukov S. One belt and one road, the clarification path and the extension zone // EurAsia Daily 03.05.2019. URL: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/05/03/odin-poyas-odin-put-utochnenie-puti-i-rasshirenie-poyasa (date of access: 14.12.2019). (in Russian)

The strategy of «The Economic belt of the silk road» and the role of the Shanghai cooperation organization. The materials of the round table / ed. by Matveev V. Moscow: Institute of Far Eastern studies RAS, 2016. 172 p. (in Russian)

Transit with a Chinese accent. 21.12.2017. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2017/12/21/746034-tranzit-kitaiskim (date of access: 15.12.2019). (in Russian)

Where will the Silk Road lead Russia 27.04.2019. URL: https://newtvnews.ru/ economics/2019/04/27/pan-ili-propal-kuda-zavedet-rossiju-shelkovyj-put/ (date of access: 16.12.2019). (in Russian)

国驻俄罗斯大使李辉: “一带一路” 倡议开启中俄共同发展的新航程 = The Chinese Ambassador to Russia Li Hui: «The one belt — one road” Initiative opens a new path for the joint development of China and Russia. URL: https:// baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1610935269955576597&wfr=spider&for=pc (date of access: 18.12.2019). (in Chinese)

Примечания

1

Renee Maltezou. Greece seeks role as China’s gateway to Europe // Reuters, June 20, 2014. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/greece-china-assets/update-1-greece-seeks-role-as-chinas-gateway-to-europe-idUSL6N0P14DW20140620 (date of access: 01.09.2019).

2

Ljudmila Cvetković. Prvi teretni voz iz Kine putuje ka Srbiji // Radio Slobodna Evropa, oktobar 1, 2019. URL: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/srbija-kina-teretni-voz/30193560.html (date of access: 02.10.2019).

3

According to: Bala Ramasamy, Matthew Yeung, Chorthip Utoktham, Yann Duval, “Trade and trade facilitation along the Belt and Road Initiative corridors”, Working Paper Series, No. 172, Asia — Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade — UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 2017, pp. 9–22; Richard Ghiasy, Fei Su, Lora Saalman, The 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road: Security implications and ways forward for the European Union, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute — Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Stockholm, 2018, pp. 4–31.

4

Rumena Filipova. Chinese Influence in Bulgaria: Knocking on a Wide Open Door? // China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, September 09 2019. URL: https://chinaobservers.eu/chinese-influence-in-bulgaria-knocking-on-a-wide-open-door/ (date of access: 02.10.2019.

5

Anne-Marie Brady, Hiromichi Higashi. Are we real friends? Albania-China relations in the Xi Era”, Sinopsis — China in Context and Perspective, Institute of East Asian Studies at Charles University // NGO AcaMedia. Prague. 2019. URL: https://sinopsis.cz/en/are-we-real-friends-albania-china-relations-in-the-xi-era/ (date of access: 02.10.2019).

6

Mario Tanev. Bulgaria’s Bulstrad files petition for bankruptcy proceedings against Litex Motors // SEENews, March 29, 2017. URL: https://seenews.com/news/bulgarias-bulstrad-files-petition-for-bankruptcy-proceedings-against-litex-motors-563353 (date of access: 10.10.2019).

7

Fondul Proprietatea: Romania’s Nuclearelectrica should not invest in more nuclear units // Romania Insider, 06 September 2019. URL: https://www.romania-insider.com/fondul-proprietatea-nuclearelectrica-investment (date of access: 05.10.2019).

8

Ryan Heath, Andrew Gray. Beware Chinese Trojan horses in the Balkans, EU warns // Politico, 27.07.2018. URL: https://www.politico.eu/article/johannes-hahn-beware-chinese-trojan-horses-in-the-balkans-eu-warns-enlargement-politico-podcast/ (date of access: 02.02.2019).

9

Western Balkans 2019: Does the EU push the Western Balkans countries to the Russian „hug“?“ // The International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies, Ljubljana, October 16.2019. URL: https://www.ifimes.org/en/9706 (date of access: 20.02.2020).

10

„Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (Text with EEA relevance)”, Official Journal of the European Union, 14.08.2009, L211, pp. 55–92. URL: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:211:0055:0093:EN:PDF (date of access: 02.02.2019).

11

About “Balkan Stabilitocracies” more in: Florian Bieber, „The Rise (and Fall) of Balkan Stabilitocracies“, Horizons, Issue No. 10, Winter 2018, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, Belgrade, URL: https://www.cirsd.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2018-issue-no-10/the-rise-and-fall-of-balkan-stabilitocracies (date of access: 15.01.2020).

12

《中德合作行动纲要（全文）》 [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cede/chn/sbwl/t1212296.htm (дата обращения: 20.10.2019).

13

《习近平会见德国总理默克尔》 [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2015-10-30/doc-ifxkhchn5606599.shtml (дата обращения: 25.09.2019).

14

《第十七次中国欧盟领导人会晤联合声明–中欧４０年合作后的前 进之路》 [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://news.sinhuanet.com/2015-06/30/c_1115774915.htm (дата обращения: 18.09.2019).

15

《第四轮中德政府磋商联合声明》 [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http:// news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-06/13/c_1119035292.htm (дата обращения: 10.09.2019).

16

《德国收获亚投行董事和副行长成大赢家》 [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://business.sohu.com/20160202/n436706282.shtml (дата обращения: 17.09.2019).

17

《习近平在德国 〈法兰克福汇报〉 发文章阐述中德合作》 [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2014-03/29/c_133222760.htm (дата обращения: 10.11.2019).

18

郑春荣：《中德协力推进落实 “杭州共识，G20成为 “行动队” 有保障》 [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: http://www/thepaper.cn/baidu.jsp?contid=1522083 (дата обращения: 10.08.2019).

19

《广东常态化开行中欧班列》. [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: URL: http:// www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-04/14/content_5064091.htm (дата обращения: 10.08.2019).

20

《德铁愿积极对接 “一带一路” 建设》 [Электронный ресурс]. Режим доступа: URL: http://paper.ce.cn/jjrb/html/2016-03/21/content_296060.htm (дата обращения: 15.09.2019).

21

China-led BRI and its Impact on India with Specific Reference to CPEC. URL: https://www.nepjol.info/index.php/joia/article/view/22592 (date of access: 28.11.2019).

22

China Belt and Road Initiative Measuring the impact of improving transportation connectivity on trade in the region. URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ research_reports/RR2600/RR2625/RAND_RR2625.pdf (date of access: 02.12.2019).

23

How China Is Winning Over the Middle East. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/how-china-is-winning-over-the-middle-east/ (date of access: 02.12.2019).

24

Next Up on China’s Maritime Silk Road: Abu Dhabi. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/08/02/next-up-abu-dhabi-chinas-maritime-silk-road-breaks-into-the-middle-east/#6022124b9bbe (date of access: 5.12.2019).

25

China’s Belt & Road Initiative In The Middle East. URL: https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/06/21/chinas-belt-road-initiative-middle-east/ (date of access: 5.12.2019).

26

China’s Belt & Road Initiative In The Middle East. URL: https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2019/06/21/chinas-belt-road-initiative-middle-east/ (date of access: 5.12.2019).

27

Chinese president back home after visits to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran. URL: http:// en.people.cn/n3/2016/0124/c90883-9008539.html (date of access: 10.12.2019).

28

China in the Post-Hegemonic Middle East: A Wary Dragon? URL: https://www.e-ir.info/2018/11/22/china-in-the-post-hegemonic-middle-east-a-wary-dragon/ (date of access: 9.12.2019).

29

The Belt and Road and China’s Long-term Visions in the Middle East. URL: http:// www.ispsw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/512_Lin.pdf (date of access: 10.12.2019).

30

China in the world and regional politics. The history and modernity. Issue XXII / ed. Safronov E. I. — Moscow: Institute of Far Eastern studies, 2017. — 400 p. URL: https:// publications.hse.ru/mirror/pubs/share/direct/211288436 (date of access: 18.12.2019).

31

Manukov S. One belt and one road, the clarification path and the extension zone // EurAsia Daily, 03.05.2019. URL: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/05/03/odin-poyas-odin — put-utochnenie-puti-i-rasshirenie-poyasa (date of access: 14.12.2019).

32

Ibid.

33

China urged to speed up the pairing of the EAEU with the project «One belt — one road», 17.10.2018. URL: https://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/108722 accessed 13.12.2019.

34

Eastern economic forum 2019. URL: https://roscongress.org/events/vostochnyy-ekonomicheskiy-forum-2019/ (date of access: 15.12.2019).

35

Transit with a Chinese accent. 21.12.2017. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2017/12/21/746034-tranzit-kitaiskim (date of access: 15.12.2019).

36

国驻俄罗斯大使李辉: “一带一路” 倡议开启中俄共同发展的新航程 = The Chinese Ambassador to Russia Li Hui: «The one belt — one road” Initiative opens a new path for the joint development of China and Russia. Режим доступа: URL: https:// baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1610935269955576597&wfr=spider&for=pc (date of access: 18.12.2019).

37

Where will the Silk Road lead Russia 27.04.2019. URL: https://newtvnews.ru/economics/2019/04/27/pan-ili-propal-kuda-zavedet-rossiju-shelkovyj-put/ (date of access: 16.12.2019).

38

Where will the Silk Road lead Russia 27.04.2019. URL: https://newtvnews.ru/economics/2019/04/27/pan-ili-propal-kuda-zavedet-rossiju-shelkovyj-put/ (date of access: 16.12.2019).

39

International experts positively assessed the results of the forum «One belt and one road» in Beijing 08.05.2019. URL: https://news.rambler.ru/other/42154117-mezhdunarodnye-eksperty-polozhitelno-otsenili-itogi-foruma-odin-poyas-odin-put-v-pekine/ (date of access: 14.12.2019).